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Abstract: Ten states, primarily from Central and Eastern Europe, will be  admitted to the 
EU in 2004. The present paper assesses the competitiveness implications of this 
enlargement for Portugal. Four specific topics are considered: the trade and industry 
effects, the implications for Portugal’s ability to attract FDI, the likely levels and 
consequences of immigration from Central and Eastern Europe and the implications for 
Portugal’s budgetary relations with the rest of the EU.  
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After the accession of Ireland, U.K. and Denmark in the 1970’s, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal in the 1980’s and Sweden, Finland and Austria in the 1990’s, the EU’s border is 
now expanding eastwards. Eight Central and Eastern European countries – the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia (the CEEC8) 
– plus Malta and Cyprus will be full members in 2004. Romania and Bulgaria are 
expected to accede in 2007. The opening of negotiations with Turkey remains conditional 
on its meeting the political criteria for accession. Given the small size of the Maltese and 
Cypriot economies, previous analyses on the subject have concentrated on the 
implications of the accession of the CEEC only. This is also the position we adopt. 
With Eastern enlargement, a region of about 100 million inhabitants emerging 
from almost half a century of Soviet domination will be integrated into the EU.  A 
process of economic integration as profound and extensive as this will have far-reaching 
implications for the current EU member states. As in any similar liberalisation process, 
the lifting of trade barriers already accomplished under the Europe Agreements allows 
for productive factors to be reallocated to more efficient activities, reflected in the 
productive specialisation of the CEE countries and, by extension, in the volume and 
pattern of their trade.1  International direct investment flows – in terms of volume and 
geographical and sectoral distribution – will be further affected by accession, as will 
overall industrial location. But the particular past of the CEE candidates poses entirely 
new issues for the EU. First of all, the applicants are in a process of transition to the 
market economy and much of the analysis of the impact of enlargement depends upon 
assessments of the extent to which the process has been completed. Secondly, the 
purpose is to integrate into the “rich man’s club” countries starting from very low levels 
of income per head (39 % of the average in the EU15). The accession of Greece, Portugal 
and Spain in the 1980s also brought relatively low-income partners into the Union, 
                                                          
1 A total of ten association agreements were signed with the EU between 1991 and 1996, leading to a 
liberalisation of market access for industrial goods over a period of (a maximum) 10 years for Eastern 
countries and five years for the EU.  The former had already opted for relatively low tariffs and quotas 
after shaking off communism however (Pelkmans, 2001, section 18.4). These agreements also include 
explicit references to the eventual accomplishment of  the free movement of services, capital and, 
conditionally, of persons. 
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though per-capita PPP-based income levels in those countries were already at about 62 
percent of the levels pertaining to EU incumbents at that time.  
The low level of economic development of the Eastern candidate countries and 
the relatively large size of their agricultural sectors lie at the heart of most of the “high 
profile” enlargement issues, such as the planned extension of the structural funds and 
Common Agricultural Policy programmes, east-west migration and labour-market 
effects. Thus, the pressure has been to establish transition periods before new members 
achieve full access to regional and agricultural programmes. For example, the capping of 
structural fund transfers to new members at the 4 % of their GDP, as decided by the 
Berlin Council, is likely to be extended beyond 2006. Recent studies suggest that 
enlargement should not put an unbearable strain on the EU budget, though the 
distribution across member states is important. Accession of the CEEC is also expected 
to lead to significant EU migration inflows, with the possibility of wage reductions and 
job losses for unskilled incumbents.  
Many studies have demonstrated that all of these issues are manageable and 
should not cause substantial economic problems to the Union as a whole. Besides, the 
benefits in terms of further trade integration and migration are substantial and will largely 
outweigh the costs of accession at the EU aggregate level  (Baldwin et al.,1997; Lejour et 
al., 2001; Breuss, 2001). However difficulties may arise in the case of particular 
members, particularly Portugal, as suggested, for instance, by Baldwin et al.(1997).  
The present paper is a broad reflection on the economic impact of Eastern 
enlargement on the Portuguese economy.  Section 2 deals with external trade; Section 3 
with inward FDI; Section 4 with migration flows and Section 5 with the Structural and 
Cohesion Fund programmes. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Trade Effects of Enlargement    
  
After Portuguese accession to the EU an important change in the country’s export 
structure occurred. As shown in Table 1, the share of the labour intensive traditional 
sectors (textiles, clothing, footwear) decreased, while the share of machinery, apparatus, 
vehicle and other transport equipment – the sectors with the highest FDI inflows in terms 
 3 
of foreign  equity in Portuguese manufacturing – increased. In 2000, the weight of this 
last group clearly overcame the traditional one (by 10 percentage points), a notable 
feature considering the predominance of the latter in the past.  However, at the end of the 
1990s the weight of the traditional sector in total exports was still much higher for 
Portugal than was the case for the EU average (respectively 30% and 6 % in the second 
half of the 1990s). 
 
Table 1:Structure of Portuguese exports (manufacturing industry) 
Product groups 
(CN chapters) 
1995 1998 2000 
Agricultural products  
Foodstuffs 
Mineral fuels  
Chemical products  
Plastics, Rubber  
Raw hides and skins, Leather 
Wood, Cork 







Vehicles, Other transport equipment 





















































Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) 
 
 
  The Portuguese economy is highly open (with exports and imports summing to 75 
percent of GDP), with most of the export and import flows taking place with the EU15 
(80.3 and 75.1 % of total exports and imports, respectively, in 2000). This exceeds the 
EU15 average by almost 20 percentage points (again evaluated over the second half of 
the 1990s).  
With the elimination of trade barriers between incumbents and accession states, 
two effects on the Portuguese economy may be predicted: a trade creation effect in terms 
of an increase in bilateral flows with the CEEC, and a shift effect, as CEE countries 
displace some Portuguese exports to EU markets.2  
                                                          
2 We do not focus on intra-industry and quality aspects of  EU-CEE trade, but  Caetano et al. (2002) 
predicts a deepening of intra-industry trade, mainly of the vertical type.   
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The extent of pre-accession integration of Eastern applicants is already substantial 
as  the Europe Agreements have led to the removal of tariffs on industrial products 
(though impediments to trade in agriculture and food processing remain). Thus many of 
the static trade effects of enlargement are already noticeable.  
As shown in Table 2, the weight of CEE countries in Portuguese external trade 
has increased from the very modest levels achieved in 1995. However, in 2000, the 
CEEC accounted for no more than 1.22 % of Portuguese exports and 1.29 % of imports. 
Among the CEE countries, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are Portugal’s main 
trading partners (accounting for 82.8% of total exports to the CEEC and 72.9% of total 
imports from the CEEC). This fact suggests that we focus particular attention on these 
three countries.  
 
Table 2: Portuguese external trade with EU and CEEC  
% of total exports % of total imports  
1995 1998 2000 1995 1998 2000 
E.U. 80.60 82.00 80.27 74.52 78.13 75.12 
CEEC 0.65 0.85 1.22 0.50 0.68 1.29 
C. Republic 0.05 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.19 0.31 
Hungary 0.13 0.30 0.45 0.04 0.17 0.15 
Poland 0.08 0.28 0.40 0.12 0.11 0.48 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) 
 
  Although Portuguese trade with the CEEC increased at a much higher rate than 
with other partners, the importance of these countries for Portuguese external trade 
remains small. It is noteworthy that imports from CEEC have increased at a higher speed 
than exports towards these markets, unlike in the Irish case for example. Other EU 
countries also registered a significant increase in trade with the CEEC – particularly 
Germany, Austria, France and Italy.3  The same three CEE countries account for the bulk 
of trade with the rest of the EU also. 
 Let us now evaluate the second effect. Is it reasonable to consider a significant 
diversion of EU imports away from Portugal and towards the CEE countries? It seems to 
us that the answer is a qualified yes. The reasons are twofold: the high degree of  
similarity between the Portuguese export structure and that of the CEEC, and the fact that 
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for the majority of Portuguese export sectors, CEEC became progressively more 
competitive during the second half of the 1990’s, as shown by an analysis of EU market 
share data. 
Similarities in export structures are evaluated using the Finger–Kreinin export 
overlapping index.4  Table 3 shows the index for exports to the EU market of countries 
"a" and "b", where "a" is a EU member and "b" a CEE country (including Bulgaria and 
Romania). An index value of 1 would indicate that the relative weight of the products 
considered in total exports is the same for both economies, while a value of zero would 
indicate a complete difference.  
 
Table 3: Finger-Kreinin export overlapping index (2000) 
 C.Rep Hung Polan Slove Slovaq Eston Latvia Lithu. Bulg. Rom. CEEC 
France 0.651 0.612 0.593 0.594 0.600 0.322 0.206 0.327 0.406 0.392 0.663 
Germ. 0.667 0.581 0.582 0.615 0.611 0.291 0.193 0.299 0.363 0.365 0.660 
Italy 0.717 0.587 0.639 0.669 0.658 0.340 0.264 0.380 0.445 0.449 0.697 
Neth. 0.443 0.548 0.453 0.403 0.430 0.396 0.293 0.379 0.343 0.328 0.505 
Bel-Lu. 0.624 0.542 0.589 0.577 0.612 0.343 0.248 0.359 0.445 0.377 0.630 
U.K. 0.535 0.646 0.505 0.488 0.500 0.364 0.232 0.285 0.329 0.342 0.583 
Aust. 0.697 0.587 0.670 0.642 0.632 0.341 0.241 0.352 0.416 0.420 0.692 
Denm. 0.556 0.526 0.534 0.507 0.490 0.436 0.307 0.370 0.395 0.428 0.598 
Sweden 0.549 0.493 0.521 0.513 0.539 0.388 0.223 0.299 0.358 0.376 0.559 
Finland 0.374 0.349 0.377 0.385 0.425 0.503 0.250 0.285 0.305 0.353 0.427 
Ireland 0.271 0.416 0.257 0.228 0.228 0.226 0.116 0.204 0.219 0.232 0.301 
Spain 0.668 0.558 0.599 0.622 0.698 0.295 0.206 0.320 0.395 0.372 0.633 
Greece 0.313 0.316 0.377 0.348 0.349 0.283 0.296 0.389 0.487 0.404 0.385 
Portugal 0.633 0.562 0.632 0.629 0.667 0.357 0.304 0.450 0.501 0.525 0.667 
Source: Own calculations based on Chelem 
 
  Portugal has, together with France, Germany, Italy, Austria and Spain the highest 
value. Being so, these countries can potentially be significantly affected by this shift 
effect. Furthermore, it is worthwhile noting that, among these countries, Portugal is the 
one that stands to benefit least from the first effect analysed above.  
To compare the competitiveness of Portuguese and CEEC exports in the EU15 
market we consider two years: 1995 and 2000. The latter year is the most recent for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3  These countries are the main trade partners of CEEC with Germany at the top, responsible in 1999, for 
about 25 % of imports from CEEC and receiving about 33% of their exports (Martín et al. , 2002). 
4 The Finger–Kreinin index is given by:  ∑ min (Si
ac ,Si
bc)  where Si
ac is the weight of product i in 
country a exports to country c and Si
bc is the weight of product i in country b exports to country c. In this 
study, “country” c is the EU. 
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which data are available, and the former is chosen as the start date because the Europe 
Agreements had just come into force at that time. Exports to the EU during this period 
will be evaluated in terms of the dynamism of EU demand and also by making use of two 
typologies that allow us to aggregate the different sectors according to relevant 
characteristics – the so-called specialisation factors and the level of technology.5  We use 
the Chelem data set elaborated by CEPII (Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales) which gives information on trade flows disaggregated into 72 sectors. 
For purposes of comparison we use the other EU Cohesion countries – Spain, Greece and 
Ireland.  
Let us start with the demand-dynamism criterion. Based on average annual 
growth in EU imports between 1995 and 2000, we distinguish three categories: dynamic 
demand (a growth rate above 5 %), sluggish demand (a positive growth rate but below 
5%) and declining demand (a negative growth rate). The results are presented in Table 4. 
  
 Table 4: Exports to the EU by EU demand dynamism ( % of total exports) 













C. Republic 7.2 45.5 47.3 8.2 62.4 29.4 
Hungary 9.7 47.2 43.1 22.1 56.5 21.4 
Poland 5.3 38.0 56.7 6.4 53.7 39.9 
CEEC(10) 7.8 40.5 51.7 12.9 52.3 34.8 
Ireland 38.3 34.3 27.4 46.7 39.7 13.6 
Greece 8.4 28.7 62.9 9.3 29.0 61.7 
Spain 6.7 53.5 39.8 9.1 54.6 36.3 
Portugal 5.5 54.6 39.9 5.3 58.4 36.3 
Source: Own calculations based on Chelem 
 
CEE countries, and Hungary in particular, increased their exports in sectors in 
which EU demand is dynamic. The same is true of the Cohesion countries other than 
Portugal, where exports in dynamic sectors declined in importance. In 2000, Portugal 
displays the lowest value in this group of sectors.  
More important than the relative weight of the different categories in total exports 
is the evolution, for each of them, of the market share of the different countries in the 
European economic area. Table 5 presents these results.  
                                                          
5 The classification of sectors in each category is based on Fernandes (2002). In both typologies, two 
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Table 5: EU market share by EU demand dynamism  
















C. Repub. 0.21 0.65 0.77 0.60 0.24 1.30 0.90 0.87 
Hungary 0.24 0.57 0.59 0.51 0.65 1.19 0.66 0.87 
Poland 0.21 0.73 1.25 0.82 0.20 1.23 1.33 0.95 
CEEC(10) 1.12 2.87 4.18 2.99 1.71 5.00 4.84 3.97 
Ireland 3.09 1.37 1.25 1.68 3.37 2.07 1.03 2.16 
Greece 0.14 0.24 0.59 0.35 0.08 0.17 0.53 0.24 
Spain 1.12 4.39 3.73 3.46 1.11 4.80 4.64 3.65 
Portugal 0.25 1.25 1.04 0.96 0.15 1.21 1.09 0.86 
Source: Own calculations based on Chelem 
 
     In global terms, of the countries considered, only two lost market share in the EU 
between 1995 and 2000: Greece and Portugal.6 The Portuguese evolution is mainly 
explained by its loss of relative position in the dynamic-demand sectors, though the same 
occurred to a lesser extent in the sluggish-demand sectors. Only in the declining-demand 
sectors was there a small increase. CEE countries, on the other hand, registered 
significant improvements in their positions not only in global terms but also in all of the 
segments considered. Of course the CEEC are not the only cause of Portugal’s declining 
market share: one must also mention the effects of the tariff and non - tariff reductions of 
the Uruguay Round.  
Next we categorise EU imports in terms of the main determining factor, 
categorised as: natural resources, labour costs, scale economies, product differentiation 
and R&D.7  Table 6 shows the weight of the sectors in each one of these categories in the 




                                                                                                                                                                             
sectors are excluded due to their heterogeneity.  
6 Concerning the Portuguese situation,  the Ministry of Economy (2002) presents a similar result.  
7 This typology, and the next one to be considered, may be criticised on various grounds: firstly, that 
competitiveness depends on factors other than the main one considered and, secondly, that the factors 
describing a particular sector may differ across countries.  Despite these limitations the typologies still 
appear to us to be useful. 
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Table 6: Exports to the EU by specialisation factors (as a share of total exports) 


















C. Republic 18.4 21.1 28.2 17.8 14.5 10.5 14.7 35.4 24.3 15.1 
Hungary 20.3 23.5 16.7 24.9 14.6 9.5 12.4 17.3 28.4 32.4 
Poland 26.4 35.3 20.1 8.3 9.9 19.6 27.5 24.8 16.5 11.6 
CEEE(10) 21.9 30.6 22.6 13.6 11.3 15.0 24.3 24.2 19.3 17.2 
Ireland 27.7 5.6 8.1 7.6 51.0 13.1 3.0 9.6 6.6 67.7 
Greece 43.7 38.6 8.7 3.6 5.4 45.0 35.7 8.3 4.5 6.5 
Spain 23.5 10.1 44.5 10.1 11.8 22.4 9.9 43.6 10.5 13.6 
Portugal 20.9 35.4 18.9 11.7 13.1 17.8 30.9 26.4 11.4 13.5 
Source: Own calculations based on Chelem 
 
In 2000, among the countries considered, Portugal and Greece are those with  the 
highest weight in the group of sectors in which labour costs are the key element, above 
the values of the CEEC and particularly those of the Czech  Republic and Hungary. In 
sectors in which the main factor is product differentiation or R&D, on the other hand, the 
CEEC have a higher weight than Portugal. In terms of evolution, the share of these 
sectors in CEE exports increased considerably whilst in Portugal it remained practically 
unchanged. Table 7 uses the same typology but now for the EU market share. 
 
 
Table 7: Market share in the EU by specialisation factors  




















C. Republic 0.43 0.95 0.69 0.84 0.37 0.39 1.11 1.39 1.67 0.47 
Hungary 0.41 0.91 0.35 1.02 0.32 0.36 0.97 0.70 2.02 1.04 
Poland 0.86 2.20 0.68 0.55 0.35 0.81 2.31 1.08 1.26 0.40 
CEEC(10) 2.61 6.95 2.80 3.26 1.47 2.58 8.53 4.42 6.16 2.48 
Ireland 1.61 0.62 0.49 0.89 3.23 1.10 0.51 0.86 1.03 4.80 
Greece 0.60 1.01 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.47 0.76 0.09 0.09 0.06 
Spain 3.27 2.69 6.43 2.82 1.79 3.55 3.21 7.33 3.09 1.81 
Portugal 0.82 2.64 0.76 0.91 0.56 0.67 2.38 1.06 0.80 0.43 
Growth rate 
(1995-2000)* 
1.46 0.13 0.96 3.01 6.87      
* average annual growth rate 
Source: Own calculations based on Chelem 
 
  The groups of sectors where product differentiation and R&D are the decisive 
determinants are those where demand in the European market grew fastest between 1995 
and 2000. Table 7 shows that in both cases Portugal (and Greece) lost market share. In 
 9 
fact, other than in sectors in which scale economies are the key factor, the Portuguese 
position deteriorated in all categories. On the contrary, CEEC gained market share in all 
segments other than those in which natural resources are most important (and trade 
liberalisation, it must be remembered, is less advanced in these sectors). Starting from an 
unfavourable situation, the Czech Republic and Hungary had already attained, by 2000, a 
market share higher than the Portuguese one in sectors with more dynamic specialisation 
factors.  
Let us now make the evaluation according to the technological level (high, 
medium and low), as reported in Table 8.  
 
Table 8: Exports to the EU by technological level (in % of total exports) 
1995 2000  
High Medium Low High Medium Low 
C. Republic 22.7 28.1 49.2 29.9 39.0 31.1 
Hungary 24.4 31.4 44.2 44.0 34.2 21.8 
Poland 13.5 26.8 59.7 18.9 33.0 48.1 
CEEE(10) 17.1 27.5 55.4 27.0 32.3 40.7 
Ireland 45.6 20.6 33.8 54.9 29.0 16.1 
Greece 7.8 13.4 78.8 9.7 14.2 76.1 
Spain 15.9 46.6 37.5 17.9 46.7 35.4 
Portugal 20.4 21.1 58.5 21.8 27.1 51.1 
Source: Own calculations based on Chelem 
 
  In 2000, low technology exports represented more than 50% of total Portuguese 
exports whilst in the case of the CEEC the value was 40.7%. In Hungary, the figure was 
as low as 21.8%. In the CEEC (and mainly in Hungary), during the time-period analysed, 
there was a strong increase in the weight of high technology sectors in total exports. In 
Portugal, the increase was marginal. Ireland is a special case with 55% of total exports 
coming from high technology sectors. The evaluation of market shares according to these 










Table 9 : Market share in the EU by technological level  
1995 2000  
High Medium Low High Medium Low 
C. Republic 0.50 0.53 0.73 0.82 1.13 0.75 
Hungary 0.47 0.51 0.57 1.24 1.02 0.54 
Poland 0.41 0.70 1.23 0.57 1.06 1.29 
CEEE(10) 1.91 2.62 4.16 4.67 4.77 4.74 
Ireland 2.48 0.96 1.24 3.41 1.92 0.89 
Greece 0.10 0.15 0.68 0.08 0.12 0.52 
Spain 2.08 5.18 3.29 2.09 5.78 3.67 
Portugal 0.75 0.66 1.44 0.61 0.80 1.26 
Growth rate 
(1995-2000)* 
6.43 1.87 0.70    
* average annual growth rate 
Source: Own calculations based on Chelem 
 
The results are clear: concerning the high technology sectors, Ireland and CEEC 
improved their positions significantly, Portugal fell substantially while Spain and Greece 
remained relatively stable. It is also interesting to note that the CEEC gained market 
share in EU in all sectoral groups, with higher gains recorded in higher technology 
sectors.  
To complement the analysis, we evaluate changes in EU market share by 
considering those products where Portugal displays high levels of revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA), as measured by the Balassa export performance index for the EU 
market.8 The sectors where Portugal has, in 2000, the highest RCA values (in decreasing 
order and considering only sectors with an RCA score greater than 5) are: knitwear, 
wood products, carpets, leather, consumer electronics and clothing. Other than consumer 
electronics, all are low-tech sectors in which production is based on low labour costs and, 
in the case of wood articles, on natural resources. In contrast, consumer electronics is a 
high technology sector in which R&D is important. In all six sectors, demand is either 
sluggish or declining.  
The evolution of the market shares of these key-sectors for the Portuguese 




                                                          
8 This is the ratio of the weight of sector i in the exports of country j to the EU over the weight of sector i 
in total EU-country exports.  
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Table 10: EU market share for the sectors with highest RCA in Portugal  
Portugal CEEC C. Republic Hungary Poland  
Sectors 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 
Knitwear 6.50 4.92 5.66 7.25 0.66 0.51 1.22 1.25 1.24 1.31 
Wood 
articles 
5.16 4.62 11.28 13.65 1.80 1.98 0.94 1.06 4.72 5.61 
Carpets 4.27 4.25 4.91 6.60 1.31 1.75 0.68 0.50 1.54 2.23 
Leather 4.72 4.59 6.05 7.04 0.98 0.57 1.16 1.22 0.98 0.84 
Consumer 
electronics 
3.84 3.23 1.61 9.07 0.01 0.86 1.06 5.61 0.37 2.26 
Clothing 3.57 2.67 13.54 14.84 1.04 0.83 1.52 1.30 4.80 3.69 
Source: Own calculations based on Chelem 
 
  In all sectors presented in Table 10, Portugal lost market share between 1995 and 
2000 whilst the CEEC share expanded. In spite of this, in most cases the improvement in 
CEEC performance is relatively modest. The exception interestingly is consumer 
electronics, where both CEEC as a whole and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, 
individually, increased their market shares substantially.  
It is possible that the price-quality structure of Portuguese exports in the EU 
market corresponds to different market segments as compared to the exports of the CEE  
countries. Caetano et al. (2002, Table 22) measure the percentages of high, medium and 
low quality exports in the total EU exports of Portugal and the CEE10 by using the  
‘trade flow unit value’ approach of Freudenberg and Müller (1991). For exports where 
the ratio A of the country’s export unit value to the average EU import unit value is 
above 1.15, the quality is considered to be high;  the quality is medium if 0.85 ≤ A ≤ 
1.15, and is low if A< 0.85.   
In 2000 only Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia had a higher share of high-quality 
exports than Portugal. The general picture is that medium quality exports predominate in 
Portugal (45.5 % of the total in 2000) whilst in the CEE countries (other than  Bulgaria) 
the low quality range predominates. Thus, it may be the case that even in sectors in which 
Portugal is losing market share it is competing successfully with the CEEC in terms of 
quality.  However this advantage could be eroded since all CEE countries other than 
Latvia and Slovenia improved the price-quality of their exports between 1993 and 2000 
while the share of each category in total Portuguese exports  remained  fairly stable.  
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The market-share analysis has shown that the growing penetration of CEE exports 
in the EU market has occurred mainly in medium and high technology sectors in which 
demand is dynamic and whose competitiveness depends largely on product 
differentiation and R&D. These are precisely the sectors in which Portugal fared worst in 
terms of EU market share. The role of FDI is relevant in explaining this evolution, in that 
FDI is largely responsible for the transformation of the comparative advantage of CEE 
countries. Multinational firms attracted to CEE countries began to export to the EU. 
Export-oriented FDI, furthermore, is more important in dynamic high value-added 
sectors, and has thus contributed to the increasing specialisation of the CEEC in these 
sectors.9  
 It is very likely that the trade adjustment process is not yet complete, particularly 
in labour-intensive sectors where liberalisation was slower. For Portugal this may mean a 
further diminution in the traditional sectors. On the other hand however, it is also likely 
that the CEEC position in the more dynamic modern sectors  will  improve further. This 
may make it more difficult for Portugal to replace its traditional sectors by more dynamic 
ones, as illustrated in Table 1. These difficulties will be accentuated if FDI is displaced, 
which is the topic to which we now turn. 
 
 
3.  Inward FDI – Competition between Portugal and CEEC? 
 
Inward FDI can be of considerable importance for peripheral countries seeking to 
converge on the more developed EU core. FDI impacts on a range of important areas: 
capital formation, employment creation, tax revenue generation and trade. FDI also has a 
number of indirect effects, involving the accumulation of  technology, knowledge, skills 
and other resources representing the intangible assets of multinational firms (Blömstrom 
et al., 2000). The competitive pressures it introduces can also act as a stimulus to greater 
efficiency on the part of domestic firms. FDI is therefore likely to increase productivity 
                                                          
9 It is nevertheless important to note the limitations of RCA analyses in this regard, as they present a static 
picture of a process that is in dynamic mutation; Barry and Hannan (2003b).  
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and promote economic growth. This effect was confirmed for the Portuguese economy by 
Flôres et al. (2002) and Proença et al. (2002).  
 There has been a spectacular increase in CEE-bound FDI over the last decade, as 
shown in Table 11. But there are several reasons to assume that this trend will receive a 
further stimulus after adhesion. Firstly, the fact that efforts to remove any remaining non-
tariff barriers are likely to be pursued more vigorously in the case of intra-EU trade. 
Secondly, accession will increase the confidence of foreign investors by allowing the 
possibility of appeal beyond the courts of the associated countries to those of the 
European Union in the event of legal disputes arising. Thirdly, EU membership serves as 
some guarantee of transparency in the legal and business environment because of the 
acquis communautaire and the culture of checking the probity of Structural Funds 
expenditures and fourthly, entry to the Single Market will fully remove customs frontiers 
and trade barriers associated with different technical standards, and will allow full access 
to government procurement contracts throughout the EU. For all these reasons accession 
is likely to represent as dramatic a change in the CEE climate for foreign investors as it 




Table 11 : FDI inward stock (in millions of current US dollars)  






































































































































 Source: World Investment Report (2001) 
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In the case of Portugal, FDI inflows increased significantly after EU accession, 
reaching a peak of nearly 5% of GDP in 1991. Between 1991 and 1994 there was a 
decrease, but after that period of time the increase in FDI inflows was resumed.  
From 1996 onwards however, significant divestment flows have been registered, 
with an increasing tendency at least until 2000.10  In 1999, foreign direct investment net 
of divestment was only 1% of GDP and was actually negative in terms of firms’ equity. 
Manufacturing industry, furthermore, received a declining share of FDI; while in 1994 
this sector captured 45.8 % of total FDI, in 2000 the percentage decreased to only 1.9%.11 
FDI in Portugal goes primarily to the property sector and to other services, mainly 
financial. This is in contrast to the situation in the CEE countries and some of the other 
Cohesion countries. For example, manufacturing’s share of FDI inflows averaged around 
40% in Hungary and Poland and 30 % in the Czech Republic.  
Some recent evidence on the diversion of FDI flows away from Southern Europe 
to the CEE countries is provided by Braconier and Ekholm (2001), who analyse a firm-
level dataset on the operations of Swedish multinational companies. They show that the 
expansion in affiliate-firm employment in CEE countries, which totalled 15,000 over the 
period 1990 to 1998, came at the expense of affiliate activity in Southern Europe where 
employment fell by 14,000 over the same period.  
A fact that may counteract this possible FDI diversion effect is that an increasing  
part of FDI comes from the neighbouring Spanish economy. In terms of FDI stock, in 
2000, Spain was the main investor, with 14.5 % of total (in 1995, Spain occupied the 
third place, after France and UK), followed by the UK and France (12.9% and 11.8%, 
respectively). Between 1995 and 2000, Germany and UK slightly decreased their share in 
total FDI stock and, in the case of France, the reduction was greater, at around 5 
percentage points. This evolution is consistent with the idea that geographic proximity 
influences the location of FDI. 
Analysis of the threat that CEEC represent as competitors for foreign investment 
cannot, however, be confined to an extrapolation of recent flows.  As mentioned earlier, 
                                                          
10 Texas Instrument, Renault, Ford, Nestlé, Siemens, among others are examples of foreign firms that 
divested by the end of the 1990’s. 
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foreign investors are unlikely to see free trade as equivalent to EU membership and after 
adhesion the advantages of the CEE countries will increase. Thus, it seems more relevant 
to conduct a comparative evaluation of the competitive position of CEEC, Portugal and 
the remaining Cohesion countries in terms of the relevant factors for the attraction of 
FDI. This is the purpose of the remainder of this section, which uses information supplied 
by the Institute for Management Development (IMD). This source provides a wide range 
of data up to the year 2002. 
In its annual report, IMD assesses 49 countries in terms of factors relevant to this 
aspect of competitiveness. In what follows we discuss the most relevant of these. All the 
evaluations are presented in a scale from 0 (representing the worst competitive position) 
to 10 (representing the best), with some exceptions. Our purpose is mainly to evaluate the 
relative position for each indicator for Portugal, the other EU Cohesion countries and the 
most relevant CEE countries (Hungary, the Czech  Republic and Poland). Table 12 

















                                                                                                                                                                             
11 In terms of stock, manufacturing industry represents 19.6% of total FDI (Leite et al., 2001).  
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Table 12: Competitiveness factors –government efficiency (2002) 
Criterion: Portugal Spain Greece Ireland Hungary C. Rep. Poland 
[1] The legal framework is not 
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Note: Values between brackets represent the country ranking in a total of 49 countries 
Source: IMD  
 
As one could expect, Ireland is by far the country best positioned across most 
criteria. Several weaknesses are evident in the Portuguese position relative to the CEEC. 
First, the justice system, a key element for the regular functioning of a market economy 
and for generation trust among investors, appears to be deficient. Other weaknesses 
appear at the level of government action: an uncompetitive fiscal system, a weak 
response to entrepreneurial needs and excessive bureaucracy are patent in Table 12. 
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Another relevant aspect is the excessive rigidity of labour markets.12 In what concerns the 
existence of venture capital and the functioning of banking services, the Portuguese 
situation is reasonable. Concerning the CEEC, two aspects should be pointed out: first, 
the strong position in particular of Hungary and the Czech Republic in the generality of 
the criteria considered, and second, their strong position with respect to criterion 11, 
reflecting the enormous effort made by these countries to attract FDI.13  
Table 13 displays information concerning infrastructure.  
                                                          
12 New labour legislation to allow greater flexibility is to be implemented in Portugal.    
13 Leite et al. (2001) also use this indicator but they take into consideration the average of the last 6 years. 
In their analysis, which includes the same countries as we do, the Czech Republic scores lowest, while 
Portugal is surpassed only by Ireland. The comparison with the present study reveals the rapid progress 
made by the CEEC in recent years. 
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Table 13: Competitiveness factors - basic, technological, health and environment 
infrastructures (2002) 
Criterion Portugal Spain Greece Ireland Hungary C. Rep. Poland 
[1] Maintenance and development 
of infrastructure is adequately 
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[12] Health infrastructure meets 















[13] Environmental laws and 
compliance do not hinder the 





























































[17] Office rent – total occupation 















Note: Values between brackets represent the country ranking in a total of 49 countries 
Source: IMD ; * - values in 2001 
 
In this case, in contrast to the indicators related to government efficiency, the 
Portuguese position is not dramatically different from that of the CEEC (once again with 
Hungary and the Czech Republic at the top position) or the other Cohesion countries. In 
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fact, despite specific differences, we do not detect, in this group of indicators, a clear 
obstacle to the attraction of FDI in any of the countries considered.  
The quality of human capital is generally agreed to be one of the major 
weaknesses of the Portuguese economy and so it deserves a more detailed study.  Table 
14 supplies information on this.  
 
Table 14 : Competitiveness factors - human capital (education and science) -2002 
Criterion Portugal Spain Greece Ireland Hungary C. Rep. Poland 
[1] PISA results (15 years of 
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Note: Values between brackets represent the country ranking in a total of 49 countries 
Source: IMD and OECD (2001); * - values in  2000. 
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Here there is a wide gap between Portugal, Greece and Poland on the one hand, as 
against the other countries considered. The comparison between Portugal and the CEEC 
is particularly damning because the central problem for Portugal is not an input question 
(the expenditures with education and R&D are at levels similar to those of the other 
countries) but because of the quality of the education and science systems, their 
connection with entrepreneurial activity and their capacity to satisfy the needs of a 
competitive economy. The low levels of literacy and the lack of skilled labour capable of 
fulfilling firms’ needs represent weaknesses of the Portuguese economy and compromise 
the ability of the country to attract FDI mainly in the case of sectors with a higher 
technological component and skilled labour requirements.  
Portugal has the lowest productivity levels in the EU15. This global picture in 
terms of human capital, together with a specialisation in sectors of low added value, 
labour intensity, facing declining demand and with a weak technological component (as 
emphasised in section 2), are decisive factors in explaining this.  
The degree of centrality (or “closeness to purchasing power”) also affects FDI in 
certain particular sectors.14 Schürmann and Talaat (2000) rank EU and CEE countries in 
this regard. Their index provides a measure of travel costs between points within the 
overall region weighted by the purchasing power that each point represents. The most 
peripheral regions at present are the Baltic states, Northern Sweden and Finland, Bulgaria 
and Romania. Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech and Slovak Republics and the Southwest of 
Poland are no more peripheral than Ireland, Spain or Portugal and are less peripheral than 
Greece.  
The main weaknesses in Portugal can only be addressed over time. On the 
contrary, the CEEC, and in particular the Czech Republic and Hungary, not only have 
displayed rapid progress in some of these respects but they are on the way to correct the 
more relevant in their case, i.e. at the infrastructure level, particularly with the 
implementation of the huge TINA transport infrastructure plans for Central and Eastern 
Europe.  
                                                          
14 In fact, only about one-fifth of foreign investment is allocated to industries where low labour costs play a 
significant role and where the share of unskilled labour is relatively high (Brücker,2001). 
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Portuguese disadvantage can be illustrated with reference to the 2002 report of the 
international consultancy AT Kearney. AT Kearney makes an annual inquiry into the 
planned foreign investment decisions of the 1000 largest firms in the world. In the 2002 
report, which puts China and the US at the top of the table, Portugal is, as in the last 5 
years, not included in the first 25 countries. This report points out three explanations for 
the Portuguese situation. First, large world firms’ managers put great emphasis on the 
budgetary and monetary policies of the different countries. The recent evolution of the 
Portuguese deficit, reaching 4.1% of GDP in 2001, weakened Portugal’s image within the 
euro zone (though it was reduced to less than 3 % by the end of 2002). A second factor is 
related to FDI origin. Propensity to invest is at present higher in USA and Japan but FDI 
inflows in Portugal are mainly of European origin. The third problem is competition from 
the CEEC. In fact, by contrast to the Portuguese position, the three main CEE countries 
that host FDI are all well positioned in the ranking of AT Kearney.              
As against this, however, it is important to note that each previous trade-
liberalisation episode within Europe increased the pool of FDI both from within Europe 
and from outside (Dunning, 1997a, b).  The goods produced by multinational firms also 
tend to have relatively high income elasticities of demand so that the expected growth in 
the CEEC10 consequent on enlargement should generate further flows of FDI into and 
within the newly expanded EU (Barry and Hannan, 2003a).  A further relevant detail is 
that the Single Market liberalisation was associated with an expansion in the average 
number of plants that the leading multinational firms in the EU maintained. Among such 
firms with plants in Portugal for example, the average number of EU countries (other 
than their home bases) in which they maintained plants rose from 4.4 in 1987 to 5 in 
1993, while the share of their European foreign production that they located in Portugal 
increased by 8 percent (Pavelin and Barry, 2003). This suggests that the development of 
the Single Market was associated with a further fragmentation of the production chain.  If 
this proves to be the case it will be efficiency-enhancing and should operate to the further 
benefit of Portugal’s foreign-owned industry. 
The notion that enlargement will considerably enhance the attractiveness of the 
CEE countries as a location for export-oriented foreign direct investment, and as such 
will allow them to compete more strongly and successfully for such investment, will also 
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stimulate Portuguese firms to invest in these countries. While Portugal has recently 
become a net investor abroad and Portuguese investment in CEE markets is  increasing, it 
remains slight, with a weight of no more than 1 % of total Portuguese direct investment 
abroad. Poland is the main destination for these firms, with 98% of the total in the 1996-
99 period.15  
                 
4. Migration  Issues       
 
The possibility of substantial migration flows from CEE countries to the EU15 is 
a widely discussed issue because of the very large income gap that exists, as well as the 
geographical proximity of the accession countries. This has led EU incumbents to favour 
only a gradual opening up of labour markets, in the knowledge that ongoing convergence 
in living standards will make substantial migration less likely. 
So far, migration flows from CEEC have been very modest, which is not 
surprising given the rigid immigration legislation in EU countries. At the end of the 
1990’s, the stock of foreign residents who have immigrated from the CEEC-10 to the EU 
is estimated at some 870,000 individuals, accounting for around 0.5 % of the total CEE 
population, 0.2 % of the total EU population and 0.3 % of the total EU workforce. The 
consensus is that, even with full liberalisation, such flows will not increase dramatically. 
The main reason is that economic convergence is likely over the medium term, while 
migration is hindered by high transaction costs and the limited absorption capacity of 
labour markets in the destination countries.   
The experience of the previous southern enlargement of Greece, Portugal and 
Spain is usually taken as a benchmark. These acceding countries also displayed 
substantial differences in terms of incomes and wages (though more attenuated) and 
geographical proximity to EU incumbent countries, but the results were very modest. 
Some of these traditional EU emigration countries have even turned into immigration 
countries.  According  to Brücker (2001), the stock of foreign residents from the Southern 
                                                          
15 Portuguese firms still prefer markets that are apparently less risky and more familiar, such as Brazil, 
Spain and the ex-colonies in Africa. 
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EU members had already reached equilibrium levels when free movement was allowed 
(between 6 and 7 years after accession).  
Estimates of likely migration patterns take into account income differences, 
distances and traditional ties between sending and receiving economies, the labour-
market characteristics and demographics of the various countries and expectations of 
future economic evolutions. Boeri and Brücker (2000) incorporate these various 
determinants, and, based on an assumed convergence of 2 percent per annum between 
CEEC and EU income levels and no significant change in unemployment rates, conclude 
that after full liberalisation a maximum of 350,000 immigrants will move in the first year 
with this figure declining to less than 150,000 a decade after. In the long term (2030) the 
population of CEEC living in the EU is expected to increase from the current 0.2% level 
to 1.1 %.   
These potential flows, furthermore, will be concentrated in particular on  
Germany and Austria, which are at the end location for over 80 percent of CEE migrants 
at present. 
Traditionally, Portugal has been characterised by emigration rather than 
immigration, and substantial immigration is not envisaged in most studies on 
enlargement. Boeri and Brücker (2000) predict the stock of CEE residents in Portugal to 
rise from a figure of 780 that they quote for 1998 to a total of 3,560 by 2030. However, 
recently, there has been a significant inflow of migrants, including from Eastern 
countries, to occupy less skilled jobs in the construction sector (which registered a boom 
in the 1990’s, in part supported by European Funds), and also in sectors such as 
restaurants and domestic services.  
Portugal has also adopted what appeared to be a more permissive immigration 
legislation than a number of other EU countries. In 1992-93 and again in 1996, illegal 
immigrants were allowed to apply for a “residence permit”. The result was the 
legalisation of around 70,000 individuals, and the prospect of a “friendly” policy towards 
immigration that largely contributed to new inflows in the late 1990’s. 
The Decree Law nº 4/2001 aimed to counteract the facilities of the previous 
decade by creating the legal notion of “temporary stay permit” in addition to the 
“residence permit”. This new status was conferred for one year to those with a work 
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contract, with the possibility of being renewed for a maximum of five years. Only in the 
end of this period may foreigners apply for a “residence permit”. The purpose of this law 
was to reduce expectations of a permanent legalisation and also to deter employment of 
illegal immigrants. It is highly expectable, however, that a significant proportion of this 
new legal segment of “temporary workers” acquire a more permanent resident status as 
shown by the experience of  other European host countries that have adopted a similar 
policy decades ago16.  
National statistics show that in 1980 there was only 50,750 legalised immigrants 
in Portugal (0.5 per cent of total Portuguese population), while by 1999 the total number 
of foreigners had increased almost fourfold to more than 190,000 (1.9 per cent of total 
population). Most of Eastern immigration is not included in these figures as just a few 
people from Eastern Europe were legally in Portugal in 1999. However, some estimates 
used by the Portuguese media report between 60,000 to 200,000 illegal immigrants in the 
turn of the decade,  most of them probably from Eastern Europe (Rita, 2002). The Social 
Support to Eastern Immigrants Association in Portugal (ASIL) estimated for mid-2002 a 
figure of 300,000 immigrants from there, while an increase to around 500,000, mainly 
relatives of those already in residence, is expected by 2004.  
Most of these Eastern immigrants in Portugal come from Ukraine, followed at 
some distance by Moldovans, Romanians and Russians. Ukrainians already represent the 
third largest foreign community in Portugal, with over 40,000 “temporary stay permits” 
granted during the legalisation undertaken in 2001, i.e., 35.4 % of the total (Peixoto, 
2002). Entrance and stay of many of these immigrants is linked to trafficking networks, 
which contributes to speed up the process of migration. 
Will Eastern immigration into Portugal increase substantially in the future? It may 
do, primarily because of low unemployment relatively to the EU average while the 
female participation rate is higher than the EU average (at 63% compared to 59% in 
1999). However, there are a range of factors that make Portugal a less desirable location 
from the viewpoint of potential immigrants. Per capita income and wage levels are low, 
the geographical position is not favourable and there are no significant cultural affinities 
                                                          
16 A new law, to start on March 2003, introduces more stringent rules for legal immigration, which will 
depend on a system of quotas, while those that in an illegal situation are enforced to leave the country.  
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or historical linkages. Besides, the unemployment rate is rapidly increasing (from 3.9% 
in the second quarter of 2001 to 5.1% in the third quarter of 2002). As unemployment 
primarily affects unskilled workers, this will make the job market less attractive.  
Another relevant issue concerns the impact of immigration. The effect on the 
labour market and on per capita income will depend primarily on immigrant skill levels 
relative to the indigenous population. If skill levels are equivalent, then with international 
capital mobility the effects are minimal. If immigrants are less skilled, the distribution of 
income becomes less equitable as downward pressure is exerted on the unskilled wage. 
Unemployment may also rise, as it tends to be concentrated among the less skilled. The 
net fiscal costs of immigration will also be larger as unskilled immigrants use more 
government services and pay less tax. All these effects will be reversed of course if 
immigrants are more highly skilled than the indigenous population. But the situation in 
Portugal, as in the rest of the EU, is that most immigrants of Eastern European origin are 
in occupations which do not fully reflect their skills.  
Requests during 2001 on “temporary stay permits” show the following 
distribution by sector of the Eastern European population: 43.6 % in construction, 21.3 % 
in manufacturing, 15.4 % in services, 6.7 % in trade, 6.5 % in agriculture, fishing and 
extractive industries and 6.3 % in hotels and restaurants (Pires, 2002). 
A possible indirect impact of future free labour will be a crowding-out of 
Portuguese emigrants by migrants from the East. Such an effect would increase further 
the pressures on the Portuguese unskilled labour market. Almost 10 per cent of the 
Portuguese population are resident in other EU countries, predominantly in France and, 
to a lesser extent, in Germany. These two countries received between 1955 and 1996, 
respectively, over 1047,000 and 344,000 Portuguese emigrants (Peixoto, 1999). Outflows 
to France decreased in the period 1975-96 (to 16% of the total registered in the period 
1955-74), but emigration to Germany diminished only slightly between these two sub-
periods. Even if such a crowding-out effect were not to occur in an expressive way,  





5. Economic and Social Cohesion Policy 
 
The coming enlargement will entail a substantial increase in demands upon the 
EU budget, notably in the cases of the CAP and the Structural Funds. It has been agreed 
however that the ceiling on the EU budget will remain at 1.27% of GDP.  
Analyses carried out in advance of the agreement reached in Copenhagen in 
December 2002 were based on an assumed net cost of enlargement of around 20 billion 
euro per annum.  On the basis of the current distribution of net income payments and 
receipts across EU member states Portugal’s share of these costs would have come to 
around 342 million euro per annum (CEPR, 2002). As is well known however, the  
Copenhagen agreement represented a considerably better deal for incumbent EU 
members than had long been anticipated. Rather than the 20 billion euro per annum 
estimate of Baldwin et al. (1997) and CEPR (2002), gross enlargement costs are now 
likely to sum to 41 billion euro over the three years 2004-2006. With 15 billion to be 
covered by new member states' contributions this brings the net cost down to only 26 
billion euro, or around 9 billion euro per annum.17  Again on the basis of the current 
distribution of net income payments and receipts Portugal’s share of these costs would 
come to around 152 million euro per annum. 
The cost to Portugal would escalate however if costs and benefits were to be  
redistributed within the EU in line with current income levels. It is well known that 
Germany bears a disproportionate share of the current burden while countries like 
France, Ireland and Greece, and to a far lesser extent Portugal, contribute less than the 
figures warranted by their current income levels.18 Over time it has to be envisaged that a 
more equitable sharing of the burden will be negotiated among EU member states. de la 
Fuente and Doménech (2001) calculate that Portugal is currently over-subsidised to the 
tune of 600 million euro per annum (compared to an Irish figure of around 2 billion 
                                                          
17 The assessment of the European Enlargement Commissioner delivered to the parliament Foreign Affairs 
Committee on January 23 was that the likely inability of the accession countries to draw down all the funds 




euro!). Given that any scaling upwards of the budgetary costs of enlargement will raise 
the profile of this item on the EU agenda, there may be a more substantial change over 
time in the flow of funds between Portugal and the rest of the EU. 
While it has been agreed that the budgetary funds assigned to each member state 
will not change during the period of validity of Agenda 2000 – i.e. until 2006 – due to the 
separation principle established in the Inter-institutional Agreement, the position is likely 
to change after that date.  If the present criterion for Objective 1 eligibility is maintained, 
the Portuguese regions of Algarve and Madeira (as well as Lisboa e Vale do Tejo which 
have already lost that status) will no longer be eligible for Objective 1 status.19  Based on 
current information, the other Portuguese regions are unlikely to lose that status by 2007, 
not is it likely that Portugal will lose its eligibility for cohesion funding.20  
 The Structural Funds – the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the 
European Social Fund (ESF), the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF) and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) – and the 
Cohesion Funds (for environment and transport infrastructure projects in countries with a 
per capita income less than 90% of the EU average) – not only stimulate demand but also 
operate on the supply side by supporting investment in infrastructure and human capital 
and thus increasing productivity and  competitiveness. Total EU transfers in the period 
1989-1999 were most pronounced in the Cohesion countries.21 Community support 
accounted for almost 15 percent of total investment in Greece in the 1994-99 period, 14 
percent in Portugal, 10 percent in Ireland and 7 percent in Spain.   
How important have those funds been for the Portuguese economy? Table 15   




                                                                                                                                                                             
18 Spain is found to contribute around one and a half  billion euro per annum more than is warranted 
according to these calculations (de la Fuente and Doménech, 2001). 
19 The exclusion of Madeira from Objective 1 is probably related to its high weight of off-shore financial 
activities and does not reflect the structural reality of the region. Nevertheless, owing to the ultra-peripheral 
region statute there is the possibility of its retaining its Objective 1 status (Ministry of Economy, 2002).   
20 This will not be the case for Spain (Martín et al. , 2002). 
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  Table 15: Impact of Structural Funds (percentage addition to GDP)  
Demand effects Supply effects Total effects  
1994 1999 2020 1994 1999 2020 1994 1999 2020 
Ireland 6.2 5.9 4.0  3.4 8.4 6.2 9.3 12.4 
Greece 1.1 4.8 1.5 0.1 4.6 8.0 1.2 9.4 9.5* 
Spain 1.9 2.9 1.9  1.4 6.8 1.9 4.3 8.7 
Portugal 7.0 8.1 7.6  1.1 1.3 7.0 9.2 8.9 
  Source: European Commission (1999) ; * - 2010 
 
 Structural Funds have played an important role in Portuguese growth and 
convergence.22  In 1986, when Portugal adhered to EU, Portuguese per capita income 
corresponded to 55.1% of EU average. In 2000, that value had increased to 75.3%. 
However, it remains a long way from the EU average; the European Commission’s 
Second Cohesion Report predicts that it will be at least 20-30 years before this can be 
attained. Furthermore, the expected convergence between Portuguese NUTS II regions 
did not occur, as divergence increased slightly in recent years (Porto, 2002).  
The 75% per capita GDP threshold for Objective 1 eligibility may be revised 
upwards to ensure that regions currently eligible for assistance and whose need will 
continue beyond 2006 are not rendered ineligible. The crucial point however is how the 
additional effort required of an effective regional funding policy in the context of the 
enlarged Union is to be financed. One solution would be to increase the limit of the “own 
resources”; this limit was fixed at the Edinburgh Summit in 1992 and has not been 
changed since then. However, the net contributory countries will hardly accept this 
solution. The other - more realistic - solution, is related to the reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). CAP expenditure is by far the largest item in the 
Community’s global budget – accounting for around 40% of EU expenditures – and 
exceeds regional development funding to a significant degree.  
CAP reform is required not only because it is one of the main policies of the EU 
in budgetary terms, but also because of the size of the agriculture sector in many 
acceding countries. With enlargement the CAP becomes even more unsustainable, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
21 At present, Cohesion Fund covers one sixth of the EU population. After the enlargement, if the criterion 
for eligibility is maintained, that value will increase to one third of the EU population. 
22 Table 15 also reveals that Portugal relied more on demand expansion, via investment in physical 
infrastructures, whereas Ireland favoured investment in human capital, which – given how that policy was 
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increasing the imperative to shift its focus away from funding production towards the 
funding of rural development. This would increase the resources available for regional 
development as other monies are freed up. 
Portugal is one of the countries that benefits least from the CAP, receiving only 
1.6 % of total transfers. In fact, it is the only cohesion country that is a net contributor to 
CAP. The transfer of part of current CAP expenditures into regional funding – entailing 
abandoning the current limit of 0.46% of EU GDP for Structural Actions – would help 




Enlargement will have important implications for Portugal. To some extent these 
are already noticeable in the wake of the Europe Agreements.  Portuguese exports bear a 
strong similarity to those from Central and Eastern Europe, and have been losing EU 
market share as the CEE economies expand.  To this extent Portugal can be said to be 
“being squeezed from below” in that its traditional export sectors are under threat. At the 
same time, its specialisation has been increasingly confined to low-technology, low-
added-value sectors with declining demand, as strong FDI inflows to the CEEC has led to 
an increasing preponderance of more dynamic sectors in their export structures. Thus it is 
also “being squeezed from above”. This suggests that there may be substantial industrial 
disruption, in response to which labour-market flexibility and dynamic entrepreneurial 
response is crucial.  A worrying aspect of this is that intersectoral mobility is generally 
easier the more highly educated the workforce – an indicator on which Portugal scores 
quite poorly.   
For this reason, amongst others, many of the CEE countries are in a more 
favourable position than Portugal with respect to future FDI inflows. Several have 
followed Ireland’s lead in offering low rates of corporation taxes, the more advanced 
ones have more highly skilled populations, and labour costs are generally lower than in 
Portugal. Upon accession, they will have equally easy access to the high-income markets 
                                                                                                                                                                             
integrated with the country’s FDI-oriented industrialisation strategy – appears to help explain its 
convergence.   
 30 
of Western Europe and, if they learn their lessons correctly, are likely to enjoy stable 
macro policy environments and regulatory and public administration systems equivalent 
to those elsewhere in the EU. This opens up the possibility that they might compete 
directly with Portugal, Spain and Ireland for FDI, as argued by Barry (2003). There is 
indeed some evidence that this is already occurring in the case of Southern Europe. 
Portugal may be particularly adversely affected given the relatively low human-capital 
stock and deficiencies in the efficiency of the government sector. 
While the former, in terms of education and training, can only be tackled as part 
of a long-term development strategy, public-sector deficiencies and flaws in the conduct 
of macroeconomic policy can be tackled more easily – if the political will to do so is 
present.  
Enlargement will also open up the possibility of more substantial labour 
migration. Most studies estimate that inflows will be quite modest, with the majority of 
migrants going to Germany and Austria. Portugal will receive only a very limited fraction 
of these flows. The impact on wages and living standards will depend on the skills of the 
migrants but if inflows are as modest as most studies suggest, these effects will be fairly 
negligible. We have pointed out the possibility however that Portuguese emigrants may 
be crowded-out from traditional destinations, putting further pressure on the Poruguese 
labour market. 
The implications of enlargement may be particularly adverse with respect to the 
country’s eligibility for Structural Funds post-2006. The low average per capita income 
of the CEEC will lead to the Cohesion Countries losing a large part of the funds they 
have been receiving in recent years. Also as a consequence of the enlargement, two 
Portuguese regions (Algarve and Madeira) will lose their Objective 1 status.    
Portugal indeed may well stand to lose most from enlargement, as Baldwin et al. 
(1997) and Breuss (2001) suggest. Nevertheless, the capacity to respond to this is  
endogenous. One recalls historian Arnold Toynbee’s theory of “challenge and response”, 
developed in his Study of History.  All cultures and societies face various challenges. It is 
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